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Introduction

T

his article examines the practice of the People's Republic of China with respect to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea {1982
LOS Conven tion),l Two principal areas will be assessed: China's efforts to accommodate the challenges of the Convention to its ocean domain as a coastal State and
its major maritime legislation to implement the Convention regime. The analysis

begins with a brief introduction of China's maritime features and a review of its
basic stance toward the Conven tion. This is followed by a discussion of the major
challenges China encountered while establishing its ocean domain based on the

Convention regime. China's efforts in implementing the 1982 LOS Convention
through national legislation are examined to assess the consistency of that statutory framework with Convention requirements. Finally, conclusions are drawn
from China's law of the sea practice. It is shown that China, fo r its part, has been
accelerating domestic procedures with a view to enabling it to comply with Convention requirements. However, China's maritime practice has not been wholly
consistent with Convention provisions. At the same time, China's oceans policy
adjustments indicate a move away from its previous position as solely a coastal
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State to that of a maritime State. To that end, China needs to set priorities to improve its overall management capacity and to bring its maritime practice into
alignment with the requirements of the 1982 LOS Convention.

China's Maritime Features and Basic Stance on the 1982 LOS Convention
China is situated in the eastern part of the Asian continent with a land territory of
9.6 million square kilometers, which ranks it as the third-largest State in the world.
As a developing country with a population of 1.3 billion, China faces an enormous
task to feed more than one quarter of the world's population on 7 percent of the
world's arable land. China's overriding national policies call for economic expansion to meet the basic and growing needs ofits huge population. In the last two decades, China has experienced tremendous economic growth, but the limited
terrestrial resources hinder its further development. With a soaring increase in
population and gradual reduction ofland resources, China has turned to the ocean
for marine resources to ease the pressure on insufficient land-based resources.
From north to south, China borders an internal sea-the Bohai Sea-and three
semi-enclosed seas-the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea
(hereinafter called the China Seas).2 China has a coastline of more than eighteen
thousand kilometers, more than 6,500 offshore islands and an island coastline of
over fourteen thousand kilometers. In the early 1990s, China embarked on a "Blue
Revolution" to develop the "Blue Economy," and this practice has continued into
this century. China has eleven coastal provinces and municipalities that cover an
area of 1.3 million square kilometers, account for 14 percent of the country's landmass in total, but support 44.7 percent ofits population and generate 60 percent of
the nation's gross domestic product.
As a land power, China did not focus as much attention as it should have on the
sea or sea power. In its long history, the foreign invasions China suffered came
mostly from the sea. Those bitter experiences made maritime security issues its
major concern} Its participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the maritime practices of its neighbors kindled
China's interest in the seas.4 In UNCLOS III, China made its first contribution to
the creation of a new international convention-the 1982 LOS Convention.
China signed the 1982 LOS Convention on December 10, 1982, the very day it
was opened for signature, and was eager to enjoy the maritime rights and interests
attached to the new regime. S However, as a coastal State bordering three semienclosed seas, China found itself disadvantaged in embracing the full entitlement under the Convention. It had to deal with overlapping boundaries with its neighbors
opposite or adjacent to its own coast and within four hundred nautical miles (nm).
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In contrast to the worldwide acceptance of the Convention's exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) regime, China hesitated to implement it.6 0verall, China considers the
conclusion of the 1982 LOS Convention a concrete step toward the establishment
of a new international legal order for the oceans, and is interested in both the legal
and economic aspects of the Convention, as well as the political implications the
Convention is bringing about. 1 On the other hand, China is not satisfi ed with those
articles of the Convention pertaining to innocent passage, the definition of the
continental shelf, boundary delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf, and the
international deep seabed regime.
After years of debating the advantages and disadvantages, China ratified the
Convention in May 1996 and established its EEZ at the same time. The ratification
makes it possible fo r China to claim its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over three
million square kilometers of maritime space to which it is entitled under the 1982
LOS Convention. It provides China with a vital opportunity to develop its "Blue
Economy," the best way to secure its national interests and the impetus to consolidate its links with the world. The Convention also enabled China to take part in
global marine affairs and, more importantly, to pursue a sustainable development
strategy consistent with that universal instrument. However, while implementing
the Convention regime, China has encountered a series of challenges.

1982 LOS Convention Challenges Encountered l1y China
Since the 1982 LOS Convention was signed, the EEZ concept has been finnly established in customary international law. By the time the Convention finally came
into force in 1994, more and more States had started to define the limits of their
maritime zones and had started negotiations to settle maritime boundary d isputes
with their neighbors. This is also the case with the China Seas, where all the coastal
States bordering those seas have made unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over extensive areas of offshore waters, including fu1l200-nm EEZ claims. s However, nowhere in the Yellow Sea does the distance between opposing coastlines reach 400
nm. Most of the East China Sea is less than 400 nm in width. Any unilateral claim of
a full EEZ or continental shelf would create substantial overlaps.
China is adjacent or opposite to eight neighboring countries surrounding the
China Seas (the two Koreas, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei
Darussalam and Indonesia).9 These States vary greatly in size, geographical configuration, social and cultural structures, and economic and political systems, b ut
many of them have contested sovereigntydaims or sovereign righ ts to different
parts of the seas, particularly some islands of the South China Sea. 10 The semienclosed seas surrounding these States provide not only distinctive ecosystems and
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abundant resources, but also a unique social and political environment. The geographical proximity and the confluence of myriad social and political facto rs, induding historicallegacy, different social systems and ideology, and international politics, have
made the relationships among the China Seas' States complex over the last century. II
The situation is further complicated by disputes over the ownership of some uninhabited islands and the boundary delimitation of the continental shelf. 12 Of the
disputed island daims concerning China, the status of the Xisha (Paracel) Islands
and the Nansha (SpratIy) Islands have been the most serious and have resu1ted in
several d ashes involving military action between China and Vietnam. i3 China also
has maritime disputes regarding the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
with Japan; these show no sign of settlement in the near future. These disputes concern sovereignty over offshore islands that are valuable to the owners because of
their locations, rather than their physical usefulness. The State that successfully establishes ownership of the islands gains enormous jurisdictional rights over the
surrounding seas by establishing an EEZ.
Prompted by the problems of boundary delimitation with its maritime neighbors, China has shown a keen interest in continental shelf issues, as they involve
China's vital interests. China's fundamental position is that the continental shelf is
the natural prolongation of the coastal State, which defines, according to its specific geographical conditions, the limits of that portion of the continental shelf extending beyond its territorial sea or EEZ that is under its exclusive jurisdiction . The
maximum limits of such a continental shelf may be determined among States
through consultations. The progress, however , has been extremely slow due to the
different principles the concerned parties employ for the delimitation, as well as
the geophysical nature of the seabed at issue. 14 South Korea argues for the median
line in the Yellow Sea and part of the East China Sea, but relies on the doctrine of
natural prolongation in the northeastern part of the East China Sea because in that
area the continental shelf extends 200 nm beyond the baseline of its territorial sea.
Carrying on with the doctrine of natural prolongation, China maintains that the
Okinawa Trough is a natural boundary between itself and Japan. Understandably,
Japan has denied this characteristic and insisted on the application of the equidistance principle.
In addition to the dispute over the ownership of islands and overlapping claims
over maritime zones, China also has to deal with the competing interests over natural resources, living and non-living, with some of its neighboring States, particularly Japan, Korea and Vietnam. Prospects for resolution of these issues are limited
due to their profound impact and critical consequence, plus the political relationship among these States. Over the years China has made a number of efforts to address disputes with its m aritim e neighbors, but these overtures have led to the
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concl usion of only a few bilateral agreements (mainly pertaining to the settlement
of fisheries conflicts), e.g., those with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. However,
the situation in the South China Sea has not changed much. The intensified competition for fishe ries resources has even resulted in clashes between fishermen
themselves, and between fishermen of one State and maritime forces of another. 15
These clashes have often resulted in the loss of property and life. 16 As a conseq uence, the South China Sea has becom e a site of tension and potential conflict.
This has made access to those waters somewhat dangerous and problematic.
Besides a host of maritime challenges, the South China Sea has also been an important consideration for China's defense and security.17The South China Sea is of
strategic importance to China, not only owing to its resources, but also for its location and value for transportation. In addition to a distinct ecosystem and rich natural resources, such as oil and gas, the South China Sea is o ne of the world's busiest
international sea lanes. It serves as a maritime superhighway with more than half of
the world's supertanker traffic and over half of the world's merchant fleet passing
through those waters every year. IS As the largest State bordering the South China
Sea, China is relying more and more heavily on this superhighway for its energy
supply and international trade. China is playing an increasingly important role in
the evolution of maritime behavior in the South China Sea. Examples include
China's participation in the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea
adopted by the member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
China in November 1999. 19 The d r iving force for China's proactive attitude in regional affairs is, on one hand, to resolve its long-standing disputes with its maritime neighbors, and to secure its interests in the South China Sea on the other. It
may also be expected that China's positive attitude will bring its management practices in line with international requirements and contribute to regional
cooperation.
Compared with its maritime neighbors, China is disad vantaged in the use of the
China Seas. Although China claims three millio n square kilometers of "blue territory" under the 1982 LOS Convention, the ratio of land to ocean space is smaller
than those of its maritime neighbors. China has engaged in negotiations to settle
maritime boundary disputes with its neighboring States. When dealing with these
issues, China has shown little interest in using international adjudication and appears to favor consultation, thereby minimizing the necessity of multilateral involvement. Predictably, China will eventually settle these disputes by its own
means. However, in situations where there is a dispute between two States as to the
interpretation or application of the LOS Convention, the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism set out in Part xv is available.
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China's Implementation o/the 1982 LOS Convention
Ratification of the 1982 LOS Convention has had a strong impact on China's maritime legislation and practice. China's commitment to the Convention's obligations is evidenced by national legislation on maritime zones. Among the maritime
zones under national jurisdiction provided for in the Convention, China has declared a 12-nm territorial sea (with straight baselines), a 24-nm contiguous zone, a
200-nm EEZ and a continental shelf. China formally promulgated the Law of the
PRC [People's Republic of China] on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
in 1992 (1992 TS/CZ Law), and the Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf in 1998 (1998 EEZJCS LaW) .20 As the most important pieces of national maritime legislation, the two laws are fundamental and decisive in their legal status and direct impact on China's LOS Convention practice,
and merit a discussion.
China's Law and Policy on the Territorial Seas
Much of China's early law of the sea practice was found in specific laws and regulationsconcerning control and jurisdiction over foreign vessels in Chinese waters, in
a number of treaties on commerce and navigation, or in bilateral agreements concluded with neighboring States. China's first national action regarding the territorial sea was the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China
on China's Territorial Sea (1958 Declaration),2l which was promulgated in September 1958, five months after the conclusion of the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). As reflective of China's early practice of
the law of the sea, the 1958 Declaration corresponded generally with the principles
of UNCLOS I as represented in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the
Sea.22 The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone did not
specify the extent of the territorial sea, but the common practice then was three
nautical miles. However, the 1958 Chinese Declaration established a 12- nm territorial sea and declared that this breadth applied to all the Chinese territories, including Taiwan and its surrounding islands, and the islands in the South China Sea.
This action may be related to the two most significant physical features of China's
geography: the length of its coastline and the size of its continental shelf. It may also
have been necessitated by the desire to control foreign fishing activities in its
coastal waters and to protect fisheries resources therein.2lThis is evidenced by the
fisheries agreements signed between China and Japan dating back to 1955 . Most
importantly, the bitter Chinese history certainly served as one of the impetuses for
China to define a wider territorial sea and to adopt a position of favoring extensive
coastal State jurisdiction.
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The 1958 Declaration also established, it/ter alia, the straight-baseline method
for delimiting the Chinese territorial sea limit and declared the Bohai Sea and
Qiongzhou Strait (Hainan Strait) as Chinese internal waters. It also prohibited the
entry of fore ign military vessels or aircraft into China's territorial sea and the national airspace above it without prior permission. These declarations were protested by a few States on grounds they constituted a unilateral extension of
territorial waters and that the straight-baseline system was invalid under internationallaw. It would be fair to say that the Chinese claim to a 12-nm territorial sea
was a reflection of what was to become an irreversible trend.
Following the promulgation of the 1958 Declaration, China enacted Regulations Concerning the Passage of Foreign Non-militaryVessels through Qiongzhou
Strait in 1964 (1964 Regulation). According to this regulation, no foreign military
vessels were allowed to pass through the strait, but foreig n commercial vessels
might pass through the strait with permission requested forty-eight hours in advance and only during daylight hours.
The 1958 Declaration and the 1964 Regulation were the basic legal docwnents
that established China's territorial sea regime. During the past decades, this regime
has not been changed, except that fo reign commercial vessels are now allowed to
pass the Qiongzhou Strait in both daytime and nighttime. The general positions of
these documents were effectively carried out on matters concerning China's territorial seas.
China's action in adjusting its territorial sea regime was made by the 1992 TSI
CZ LaW.24 In general, the 1992 TS/CZ Law maintained the principles of the 1958
Deciaration,2S but improved the territorial sea regime in a number of aspects, including control over foreign scientific research and other activities,U. clarification
of enforcement authoritiesp and the establishment of a contiguous zone. 28 Some
articles of the 1992 TS/CZ Law are, however, inconsistent with the LOS Convention regime regarding innocent passage of warships and jurisdictional control of
security in the contiguous zone. 29
China's consistent navigation policy that there is no right of innocent passage
for warships through the territorial sea posed a constraint on China's ratification of
the 1982 LOS Convention. China insists that foreign warship transits should be
regulated by requiring prior authorization of, or notification to, the coastal State
before passing through the territorial seas. This policy was reiterated in the Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of China (1983), which provides
that "no military vessels of foreign nationality may enter China's territorial seas
without being authorized by the Government thereof."XI Although China is not the
only nation to have such a requirement-there are more than thirty nations in the
world that have made similar pronouncements on this issue-it is suggested that
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China amend its legislation on the issue of innocent passage. China may begin by
modifying the requirement for prior authorization to one of prior notification for
foreign warships wishing to pass through its territorial seas. Such a policy may be a
workable compromise between Chinese navigation policy and the innocent passage provisions of the LOS Convention.
Security has been the issue of most concern to China. This is reflected in Article
13 of the 1992 TS/CZ Law, which provides that China exercises control in the contiguous zone to prevent and impose penalties for activities violating Chinese laws
and regulations on security, customs, fiscal , sanitary or entry-exit control within its
territory, internal waters and territorial sea. The addition of security control is said
to be on the basis of existing State practice and China's special circumstances, but it
has been criticized for not being consistent with the 1982 LOS Convention.
China's EEZ Legislation and Enforcement
China proclaimed its EEZ upon ratifica tion of the 1982 LOS Convention in 1996.
This enabled China to declare sovereign rights over a significant ocean domain,
guaranteed its growing interests in ocean-related activities and provided an impetus fo r China to focus increased attention on the sea bordering its landmass. China
finalized its laws on the EEZ and continental shelf by adopting the 1998 EEZ/CS
LaW.)l With its sixteen articles, this law ensures China's sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and continental shelf, and safeguards China's national interests.n lt provides a legal framework to manage China's marine resources pursuant
to the requirements of the 1982 LOS Convention.
The LOS Convention recognizes historic title or historic waters in articles 10(6),
IS and 46(b) without defining them . It has been observed that the Convention regime for such waters is to be determined in accordance with customary intemationallaw. 3l China's 1998 EEZ/CS Law provides in Article 14 that the provisions of
"this law shall not affect the historic rights that China en;oys."}4 This provision is
confusing in that it does not specify what provisions might affect China's historical
rights, and it is not clear what "historical rights" arc being referenced}S Arguably
these rights refer to traditional fishing rights in the South China Sea, as China
claims historic title to these waters. 36 Given the overlapping EEZ claims and fisheries disputes between China and its maritime neighbors, it remains to be seen what
measures could be worked out among them to resolve this non-specific claim to
historic rights.
EEZ enforcement is a key component for coastal State parties to the 1982 LOS
Convention in which coastal States' jurisdictional rights are provided to ensure the
compliance of management measures in their EEZ. According to the Convention,
the EEZ is an area of shared rights and responsibilities between coastal States and
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foreign States.37In regard to State practice on EEZ enforcement, there is great variation in the national regimes that coastal States have put in place. 3a China favors
extensive and exdusive jurisdiction over sea areas for the coastal State, and holds
the view that a coastal State is entitled to more control over its EEZ than that provided by the LOS Convention.39
Regarding the legal status of the EEZ, China opposed the position that the EEZ
showd be regarded as part of the high seas. It argued that if the EEZ was to be considered part of the high seas, then it would make no sense to establish such a zone. 40
As far as the rights of other States in the EEZ are concerned, China stated that normal navigation and overflight wowd not be affected since neither was it part of the
territorial sea. Further, China considers that its EEZ serves as a buffer zone for defense. 41 This position is demonstrated by the 2002 amendment of the Surveying
and Mapping Law of the People's Republic of China (1992). 42 According to China,
the EEZ is a new zone with specific legal status, 4) and coastal States have the right to
protect, use, explore and exploit all the natural resources in the zone; to adopt necessary measures and regulations to prevent the resources from being damaged or
polluted; and to exercise overall control and regwation of the marine environment
and scientific research within the zone.
Along with the development ofEEZ activities in the seas, China's maritime law
and policy have been enhanced to deal with enforcement issues, induding the basic
principles of management. Although lacking sufficient capabilities to enforce jurisdiction throughout its EEZ, China has adopted strict domestic measures to control the activities of other States in those waters; these have reswted in some debate
about their legality.oW Indeed, China does not have laws to specify operational procedures for EEZ enforcement. This leaves its 1998 EEZJCS Law incomplete and difficwt to implement.4s With no other law in place to fill the gap and an urgent need
for EEZ enforcement, China needs to accelerate its legislation and improve its capacity for EEZ enforcement. China's practice shows that the EEZ is a relatively new
regime in international law, and that its precise nature and the full conceptualization of coastal States' and other States' rights and responsibilities in the EEZ are still
evolving. 46
As a coastal State with increasing interests in the seas and oceans, China has
moved away from its previous practice. China has taken action to build up its capacity and institutional framework with long-term strategiesY With security being the number one issue, China has made an effort to develop its EEZ
enforcement fleet. The Chinese navy, though mainly a coastal defensive force, is
one of the largest in the world. In addition, China has devoted more attention and
effort to participation in international and regional marine affairs. These activities
have contributed to the image of China as an emerging maritime power.
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Conclusion
As the most authoritative international instrument with the widest acceptance, the
1982 LOS Convention has changed access to, and the regulation of, the world
oceans and ocean-related activities. It provides basic principles for the development of national law and policy and guidelines for State practice, and has remained
a dynamic instrument and a point of reference for legal norms at the global, regional and national levels in dealing with the countless marine issues. 48
As the nation with the greatest population in the world, China is playing an increasingly more active role in international affairs and is undergoing a rapid transformation into the world's most influential force in globalization. In the realm of
the law ofthe sea, the years that have followed China's ratification of the 1982 LOS
Convention have witnessed major changes in China's attitude toward the Convention and international marine affairs. Through the implementation of the LOS
Convention framework, China has made a distinctive enhancement in the development of Chinese national law and policy.
This analysis of China's implementation practices has shown that China has
embraced opportunities to develop its legal and policy framework to safeguard its
rights and interests related to the oceans and seas. In reviewing the actions taken, it
can be concluded that China, as a contracting party, has made a solid effort to implement the 1982 LOS Convention regime. China, for its part, has been accelerating domestic procedures with a view to enabling it to comply with Convention
obligations, and has made progress in legislative harmonization and policy adjustment. Notwithstanding its noticeable effort, the LOS Convention practice of China
has not, as a whole, been totally consistent with Convention provisions-its legislation is incomplete and enforcement remains weak. China's position is clear: to
secure an opportunity for its national interests and to accept the accompanying
commitments at the same time.
China once focused almost exclusively on its status as a coastal State. Now China
has come to realize that freedom of navigation throughout the world's oceans and
through and over international straits is indispensable not only for its booming international trade but also for ensuring the steady stream of imported oil necessary
to fuel its remarkably growing economy. Facing considerable structural, manpower and financial constraints within the ocean administrative system, China
needs to set priorities to overcome political, economic, legal and technical obstacles, and to improve its overall management capacity. China also needs to adopt
operational regulations regarding maritime enforcement issues to comport with
the requirements of the 1982 LOS Convention.
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